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ince the landmark To Err Is Human report, 1 many studies have shown that health care is often hazardous rather than beneficial to patients, with unnecessary morbidity and mortality. [2] [3] [4] However, similar contributing factors-complexity of the work processes, organizational characteristics, and professional autonomy [4] [5] [6] -can be found in other industries, some of which have found good approaches to mitigate the factors' effect on safety and quality. Nuclear production, for example, is widely recognized for its innovations in approaches to safety. 7 Many authors have advocated the diffusion of innovations from other high-risk industries into health care to improve safety. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] According to Rogers, an innovation is "an idea, practice, or objective perceived as new by an individual, a group, or an organization," and diffusion is "the process in which an innovation is communicated, through certain channels over time, among the members of a social system." 20(p. 5) As Greenhalgh et al. indicate, diffusion often is not a passive process but involves negotiating, influencing, and a staff that can enable change and "help it happen." 21 One example of an innovation diffused into health care is the investigative tool of root cause analysis, which emerged and spread through many industries, including nuclear power, aviation, and chemical plants. 12 Since 1995, The Joint Commission has required that it used to identify the causes of errors and incidents. 22 As another example, a children's hospital improved its intensive care unit handoff practice on the basis of the Ferrari's Formula 1 TM races. 13 The aviation industry is seen as comparable to health care because of its similarities in (a) the use of technology, (b) the requirement of highly specialized professional teams, and (c) the existence of risk and uncertainties. 6, 8, [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] It is the improvement in safety that the aviation industry has been able to achieve that has sparked special interest in health care. For example, between 1994 and 2006, the average rate of fatal accidents decreased from 0.05 to 0.022 per 100,000 departures, which led Pronovost et al. to conclude "health care's slow and
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Article-at-a-Glance Background: Many authors have advocated the diffusion of innovations from other high-risk industries into health care to improve safety. The aviation industry is comparable to health care because of its similarities in (a) the use of technology, (b) the requirement of highly specialized professional teams, and (c) the existence of risk and uncertainties. For almost 20 years, The Rotterdam Eye Hospital (Rotterdam, the Netherlands) has been engaged in diffusing several innovations adapted from aviation. Methods: A case-study methodology was used to assess the application of innovations in the hospital, with a focus on the context and the detailed mechanism for each innovation. Data on hospital performance outcomes were abstracted from the hospital information data management system, quality and safety reports, and the incident reporting system. Information on the innovations was obtained from a document search; observations; and semistructured, face-to-face interviews. Innovations: Aviation industry-based innovations diffused into patient care processes were as follows: patient planning and booking system, taxi service/valet parking, risk analysis (as applied to wrong-site surgery), time-out procedure (also for wrong-site surgery), Crew Resource Management training, and black box. Observations indicated that the innovations had a positive effect on quality and safety in the hospital: Waiting times were reduced, work processes became more standardized, the number of wrong-site surgeries decreased, and awareness of patient safety was heightened. Conclusion: A near-20-year experience with aviationbased innovation suggests that hospitals start with relatively simple innovations and use a systematic approach toward the goal of improving safety. disappointing efforts to improve safety contrast with the remarkable success of aviation safety." 23(p.480) As in aviation, health care professionals have been urged to standardize work processes, employ checklists to ensure that patients receive evidence-based interventions consistently, 24, 25 and use robust, scientific methods in collaborative efforts to identify and mitigate risks.
26, 27 However, others have stressed the importance of learning from aviation's safety culture instead of just copying individual methods or models. [28] [29] [30] [31] Sorra and Nieva, for example, have defined a safety culture as follows:
The product of the individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of an organization's health and safety management. 32 On the basis of selected literature, [28] [29] [30] [31] the following four dimensions appear to be relevant in determining a safety culture:
1. Mastery of risks (reporting errors, correction and analysis of errors, learning from [near] airplane crashes) 2. Social orientation (curtailing operator autonomy while preserving operator authority, increasing knowledge and skills in cockpit communication and helping) 3. Awareness of risks (anticipation of weather conditions, acceptance of human factors in safety)
4. Aversion to reporting errors (rigid focus on prevention, transparency with respect to errors, not covering up near misses during flights)
Comparing the safety culture in naval aviation and hospitals, Singer et al. showed that the safety culture was three times better on average among naval aviators than hospital personnel and that naval aviators perceived a culture that was up to seven times safer. 33 The authors contended that health care systems could benefit from adapting some of the structures, systems, and practices that have proven effective in aviation. Yet, little is known about how those practices are diffused in health care.
For almost 20 years, The Rotterdam Eye Hospital (Rotterdam, the Netherlands) has been engaged in diffusing several innovations from the aviation industry throughout the organization, as we describe in this article.
Methods
We used a case-study methodology to assess the application of innovations in the hospital, with a focus on the context and the detailed mechanism for each innovation. 34 We adapted the Greenhalgh et al. framework 21 to analyze the diffusion of inno- 
GETTING STARTED
In the early 1990s, the hospital was at risk of being taken over by an academic hospital. The Dutch government allowed it to remain a stand-alone hospital only if it was able to achieve high production volumes, low costs, and a specific patientcentered approach. In 1992, the hospital was providing highquality clinical care but had serious problems with patient logistics, as seen for example, in long wait times. The hospital decided to benchmark with aviation, given its accomplishments in handling more passengers, improving logistics and safety, and being service-oriented (as one senior manager described the industry). The fact that the same CEO and chief financial officer have been in place since the decision to benchmark was made has facilitated the continuity in policy. The CEO [U.F.H.]-a physician-played an important role in championing the program and in "selling it" to the medical staff. Many of the physicians seemed to find aviation to provide an acceptable model, which was useful in winning their involvement in quality and safety programs.
Innovations
For each of the six innovations, as shown in Figure 1 (page 342), we describe (a) the application, (b) the observed effects on quality and safety, and (c) the facilitators and barriers. Sidebars describing additional features and outcomes and other aspects of the innovations are available in the online article.
INNOVATION 1. PATIENT PLANNING AND BOOKING SYSTEM (1992)
Application. The purpose of the patient planning and booking (reservations) system, which was fully implemented by the end of 1992, was to reduce delay and to realize a more efficient system for patient logistics. The system was developed by careful study of the reservations system used by Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM). A KLM logistics expert worked in the hospital for more than a year to help implement a comparable system. The most important change was distinguishing central capacity management (master planning) from decentralized booking of individual patient visits. A central logistics department was introduced, which was responsible for master planning, including balancing office visits and surgeries-so physicians were no The Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Patient Safety longer directly involved in planning and booking. The planning and booking system remain operational, and software uses are being expanded to reduce manual labor.
Effects on Quality and Safety. The new planning system led to a reduction of waiting time from an average of 12 (in the early 1990s) to 4 weeks. The surgical productivity doubled, and the number of office visits increased from less than 100,000 to almost 140,000 patients per year, while the average capacity remained unchanged (Table 2 , page 343). Because of increasing use of ambulatory surgery, the number of inpatient beds was reduced.
Facilitators and Barriers. Hospital staff were not able to diffuse the innovation by themselves. In 1992, aviation logistics experts introduced staff to the patient planning and booking system and trained them on an adaptation of the software. One of the challenges was that the information technology that supported the system in aviation was not available in the hospital. The hospital had to develop a Microsoft ® Excel ® -based system, which involved much manual work to operate, and the required software did not become available until 2008. In addition, at the start the hospital had little logistic expertise and therefore had to hire logistics experts and build their patient logistics department from scratch.
Although pilots are not involved in booking, physicians usually are, so introducing the system led to a loss of some autonomy for the physicians, who were no longer able to set their own schedules. The physicians' initial resistance lessened as they experienced the benefits of the innovation, which included far less administrative work-and more time for patient care, resulting in increased revenue. As one ophthalmologist remarked, "I am satisfied when I can spend my time on patient care instead of other burdens." Another ophthalmologist stated, "In this hospital, everything is organized around our specialty and therefore we can focus on quality and volume. In other hospitals, ophthalmologists are usually low on the totem pole when it comes to utilizing surgical rooms and technological resources." Thus, although the planning system was partly copied from aviation, the implementation process was not. The master planning system and the compartmentalized booking departments are still operational today.
INNOVATION 2. TAXI SERVICE (2006)/VALET PARKING (2008)
Application. Because of the hospital's inner-city location and the fact that more than 50% of the patients commuted from the surrounding counties, parking problems were endemic. Patients often were late for appointments, stressed, and dissatisfied with the overall travel experience. The hospital, inspired by airport shuttles, implemented a taxi service to bring patients to the hospital. In collaboration with a health travel provider, the hospital began a cataract taxi service ("cat cab") in 2006. The service was cancelled the following year, however, because of lack of financing. The hospital then contracted with a private valet parking service in 2008, which remains in operation and almost breaks even now.
Effects on Quality and Safety. The taxi delivery can be viewed as addressing service and quality. Cataract surgery is usually performed under local anesthesia, so that a low stress level for patients is important. No evidence exists, however, that the taxi service or valet parking led to a reduction in patients' preoperative anxiety. Patients were satisfied with the taxi service concept, even when paying out of pocket. A satisfaction survey 
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showed that for 114 patients, 91% found it more convenient than public transportation, and 87% agreed that they arrived more relaxed in the hospital. Valet parking, common in the United States, has since been used by an increasing number of patients at the hospital, the first in the Netherlands to provide such a service. Facilitators and Barriers. The hospital administration was able to diffuse the service themselves by contracting with external parties. It sought a less expensive alternative to taxi service, however, after the health insurers were no longer willing to reimburse the costs. The hospital co-financed valet parking by asking for a small contribution from patients and drawing on innovation funds.
INNOVATION 3. RISK ANALYSIS (2004)
Application. Wrong-site surgery, one of the worst types of patient harm that can occur in any hospital, 35 was occurring an average of five to six times a year at the hospital (Table 2) . To eliminate adverse events, especially wrong-site surgeries, the hospital introduced Toyota Production System (TPS) Lean Six Sigma risk management, a methodology broadly applied in aviation and other industries. 36 Multidisciplinary risk management teams of physicians, residents, nurses, administrators, and quality executives (five to eight participants each) pursued risk analysis, in which they analyzed critical processes in the hospital and used the methodology to identify risks and propose improvements. Risk management experts were hired to assist in five training sessions for each team to train the staff in using the methodology. On the aviation safety experts' advice, the methodology was adapted to the hospital setting, given its less intense focus on safety. For example, the time frame for conducting root cause analyses was shortened.
When reporting incidents and near-incidents, health care professionals are asked to assess risks on the basis of estimated frequencies and severity. Beginning in 2006, the hospital began using the risk-analysis method in developing clinical pathways, and since 2009 it has applied the method to its safety reporting management system.
In 2009, a digital safety-reporting management system was introduced, and three safety committees (surgery, outpatient, facilities and administration) each performs one risk analysis per quarter. Incident reporters are asked to estimate the risk based on frequency and severity for every incident or nearincident. Starting in 2010, internal quality audits have focused on processes instead of on individual departments.
Effects on Quality and Safety. The risk-analysis method helped to identify critical gaps in various processes and stimulated the introduction of checks during patient intake and screening in the wards and recovery rooms. The majority of the identified risks were related to human factors, such as ophthalmologists' late arrival and their and other staff members' illegible handwriting and communication failures. The actions reduced but not eliminate wrong-site surgeries (Table 2) .
Facilitators and Barriers. There was no "risk management culture" in the hospital, according to the aviation safety experts, because when protocols are set in place professionals are not held accountable and do not feel obliged to follow them.
Also, the experts felt that the full range of factors contribut- ing to wrong-site surgery may not be fully understood and that staff might not always comply with intraoperative interventions to prevent wrong-site surgery.
Yet the process-based approach for risk management was received with enthusiasm by the medical staff and other staff, primarily because it was practical and directly related to everyday routines and largely perceived as effective. As one ophthalmologic resident stated, "It is really useful to visualize your work from a bird's-eye perspective and to see what kind of things people are doing before and after you."
One of the experts stated, "When I compare the situation in the operating room to the cockpit, it seems as if I go back 30 years in aviation history." Physicians, for example, have much more leeway in terms of using guidelines and procedures than pilots. The hospital also lacks the aviation industry's strict system of registration and accountability for cases in which checks are not performed.
INNOVATION 4. TIME-OUT PROCEDURE (2004)
Application. Continuing the attempt to eliminate wrongsite surgeries, in 2004 the hospital introduced another innovation from aviation, a "time-out" procedure. Immediately before surgery and with all members of the surgical team present, a final check is conducted using a standardized (open) questionnaire to ensure that the surgery being performed is on the right patient and on the intended side. 37 The time-out procedure includes a check of the required materials (for example, intraocular [implant] lens, donor cornea) and the patient's health status with respect to the planned surgical procedure, comparable with aviation's flight plan before takeoff. The procedure is in addition to the normal preparatory checks and is documented in an anesthesia data system. Effects on Quality and Safety. Time-out was introduced after the occurrence of a number of (near-) wrong-site surgeries despite safety checks earlier in the process. Since its introduction in 2004, the number of wrong-site surgeries has dramatically decreased, while more near-incidents were reported ( Table  2) . One ophthalmologist stated, "The simplicity of the protocol, the involvement of staff during implementation, and the fast, clear results were eye-opening. It should be a rule always and everywhere to start surgery with a time-out." The time-out procedure, however, was not used during all surgeries. For the wrong-site incidents that occurred in 2005, 2008, and 2009, analysis revealed that the time-out procedure was not performed or not performed correctly.
Facilitators and Barriers. The hospital was able to diffuse this innovation without the help of aviation safety experts. In the aviation version of the time-out procedure, the entire flight crew follows the final checklist with all relevant parameters immediately before departure. Each team member is asked certain questions to ensure total participation and dissemination of relevant information. The hospital copied the concept but used its own content, drawing on the Universal Protocol for Pre venting Wrong Site, Wrong Procedure, Wrong Person Surgery.
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Representatives from the medical staff were involved in both the design and implementation of the time-out procedure. Yet, again because physicians traditionally have more autonomy, the safety procedure was not used regularly. Although most of the physicians followed the procedure without fail, others did not use the procedure at the outset, while others used it only when not pressed for time. The hierarchy in health care, which is stronger than in aviation and other industries, led us to assign responsibility for the procedure to the ophthalmologists, but the same hierarchy discouraged others from confronting ophthalmologists who did not carry out the procedure. For the medical and surgery staff, using checklists was first primarily viewed as a time-consuming activity without clear benefit. Yet, ophthalmologists' compliance improved when it became known that no wrong-site surgeries had occurred when the procedure was used and after the hospital received recognition in 2004 in the form of the Golden Helix Award. 38 One ophthalmologist commented, "The fact that we were used as an example has greatly encouraged me to take the time-out seriously." As stated, the goal of ophthalmologists' 100% compliance remains unmet. For example, registration as documented in the anesthesia data management system showed a noncompliance of 2%, while the surgical department expected underreporting and nonreporting of incorrectly or incompletely conducted time-out procedures. Greater understanding of staff 's perception of and barriers to complying with time-out may improve compliance and facilitate the design of more effective and efficient procedures.
INNOVATION 5. CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2007)
Application. To improve teamwork, safety awareness, and compliance with the time-out procedure, the hospital diffused a fifth innovation from aviation, Crew Resource Management (CRM), a safety training program that is mandatory for airline pilots worldwide. Five aviation safety experts with experience in training flight crews led hospital staff in adapting CRM training as used in aviation to the medical context and, in pairs, taught the program to multidisciplinary medical teams. The four-hour sessions were as follows (see Sidebar 5 in online article):
1. Session 1 consisted of a presentation and discussion of the context of patient safety (human factors) and the consequences and necessary tools of teamwork (communication).
2. Session 2 elaborated on the theory and practice of the core notions of situational awareness for risk situations and decision making, with discussion of causes and appropriate reactions to faults and (un)acceptable risks.
3. Session 3 addressed personality and (non)functional behavior in relation to patient safety. Leadership and the importance of accountability were important themes. Participants were asked to openly discuss their personal experiences with safety issues.
4. Session 4 took place in a Boeing 737-800 flight simulator, an environment in which the trainees had to use their newly learned skills without being able to fall back on their professional technical skills. The simulator was also used as an incentive for physicians to become involved in the training.
The training was mandatory for everyone but physicians, 70% of whom participated; starting in 2009, participation was made mandatory for all residents, nurses, managers, and ophthalmologists physicians (as agreed by management and medical staff ). The hospital provides CRM training for current and new staff on an ongoing basis, and since 2009, it has extended the training to outpatient-clinic teams. Efforts are being made to investigate the effect of the training in terms of incident reporting and patient outcomes and to use feedback from staff to develop training that best meets their needs.
Effects on Quality and Safety. There is no evidence that ophthalmologists' compliance with the time-out procedure has improved since the CRM training was provided. Yet, positive feedback on the training has been provided. For example, one of the ophthalmologists stated, "Yesterday I had to perform a complex lamellar keratoplasty surgery. I have the different stages of the surgery written down and always study it beforehand. I often thought about taking these notes with me, but I was afraid of losing face-I am an experienced surgeon and I should be able to do this! The safety training showed me the importance of showing your doubts and vulnerabilities. Ever since, I have taken my notes with me. It feels like a victory."
Facilitators and Barriers. As stated, in contrast to the mandatory participation in the training program in aviation, the hospital's management was not initially able to require ophthalmologists to participate. The aviation safety experts who provided the training were viewed as credible by the participants, given the comparability between aviation and health care-and the cockpit and the operating room-as well as the fact that they did not occupy positions in medical hierarchy.
One nurse commented, "You take him seriously because he's an expert from aviation, and he therefore is also able to approach all the participants in the training-doctors and nurses-as if they were on the same level."
INNOVATION 6. BLACK BOX (2008)
Application. To stimulate further the use of safety management principles, the hospital introduced a sixth innovation inspired by aviation's "black box," which by recording all flight crew activities is used to determine the cause(s) of an accident. In adopting the innovation, the hospital recorded surgical team activities. The aviation safety experts videotaped several ophthalmologic surgeries, which were provided to give the team feedback on the application of the safety procedures that were taught during CRM. Adherence to protocols for the production, use, and distribution of the images (which are not part of the medical record) was documented.
Effects on Quality and Safety. The video recordings revealed team-specific differences in performing the time-out procedure and in use of the safety communication rules agreed on during the CRM training; they also showed that the absence of team members at the preoperative briefing resulted in less structure and some communication lapses during the surgery. As one of the aviation safety experts, who had provided CRM training, said, "It is a new and inspiring experience for ophthalmologists to see their own performance . . . within their environment. It confirms the notion that surgery is a team activity." Video images showed the importance of teamwork; it is difficult to deny teamwork failures when they are clearly shown on tape.
Facilitators and Barriers. While the black box used for recording in-flight images and voices is automated, because of financial constraints the hospital used the somewhat more intrusive handheld videorecorder. The medical staff were initially hesitant to participate, fearing that recorded unexpected outcomes could be used against them. Only ophthalmologists who participated in the CRM program, who knew and trusted the aviation safety experts, consented to have their surgeries vidorecorded, and only if the images were used solely for their own training. The ophthalmologist-in-chief, who declared his willingness two months into the program to make the recordings available to all the hospital's attendings, residents, and nurses, along with attracting media attention (http://nos.nl/video/32459-chirurgen-gaan-samenwerken-metpiloten.html) stimulated others to get involved in the program. The hospital is seeking funding to develop a continuous, automated videorecording system for all surgeries and is expecting a decision soon on whether the Health Care Inspectorate (IGZ;
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http://www.igz.nl/ english/) will develop legislation concerning the production and use of such recordings.
Discussion
None of the six innovations from the aviation industry that have been diffused in patient care processes at The Rotterdam Eye Hospital since 1992 could be exactly replicated-all needed to be adapted for use in health care. The taxi service and the black box concept were inspired by the aviation industry, but their deployment and purpose were altered. The remaining innovations used the same principles for similar purposes, but with different content. Observations indicated that the innovations had a positive effect on quality and safety in the hospital: waiting times were reduced, work processes became more standardized, the number of wrong-site surgeries decreased, and awareness of patient safety was heightened. In general, the health care professionals at the hospital were interested in participating in the innovations, especially when aviation safety experts were directly involved in implementing them. There were also indications that they talked more openly about their safety concerns and the risks and ways to counteract them. Yet, in the absence of validated measures and an experimental design, the article is limited to a description of the innovations and lacks systematic evidence for their effectiveness.
Together, the six innovations addressed the four dimensions of safety culture previously cited-mastery of risks, social orientation, awareness of risks, and aversion to reporting errors. [29] [30] [31] The interviews showed that the ophthalmologists and other hospital staff became increasingly aware of safety issues because of the interventions. Innovation 3 (risk-analysis method) and Innovation 4 (time-out procedure), which were used to prevent, correct, and analyze errors, particularly addressed the mastery of risks within (surgical) processes. For both innovations, the multidisciplinary approach was experienced as a change from a functionally oriented culture. As Tal and Lichtenfeld have recently shown, health care's learning from aviation is primarily not about borrowing methods but rather is about changing professional and organizational culture. 39 Innovation 5 (CRM training) and Innovation 6 (black box) seemed to promote social (team) orientation and risk awareness and to discourage aversion to reporting. Feedback based on videorecording, as described in Innovation 6, appeared to address all four safety-culture dimensions. The efforts to overcome staff 's hesitation to participate in videorecording reflect the importance of trust in the process of a culture change. Yet, data regarding the effects of the innovations on safety culture are not available; only in 2007, after the first four innovations had already been implemented, was a hospitalwide survey, the Error Culture Questionnaire, 28 distributed. The survey was again recently distributed; results are pending.
The study also showed that a number of barriers have to be overcome for successful diffusion of innovations from aviation or indeed other industries. Health care financial resources are often limited or earmarked for specific purposes. Many of the innovations required new sources of funding, for example, for hiring senior people from aviation to serve as experts, often for extended periods. It is unclear how such infrastructure investments should be financed in health care. Because aviation is also a much more forward-looking industry when it comes to the use of information technology, virtually any innovations are likely to operate less efficiently in health care.
As stated, professional autonomy is more deeply entrenched in health care (physicians) than in aviation (pilots), so it is all the more important that physician "champions" are actively involved in diffusing the innovation. 40 In aviation, safety has been high on the agenda for decades, and a coherent safety system evolved in the form of a structured and supporting culture in which there are few degrees of freedom in following safety guidelines, regulations, and procedures. The issue of the relationship between physicians' sense of professionalism and a safety culture is outside the scope of this article, but attempts to diffuse innovations from aviation or another industry into health care may be more likely to contribute to a safety culture when a series of innovations are pursued, as was the case at The Rotterdam Eye Hospital. In addition, the fact that the hospital has had almost all the same board members since 1992 has consolidated the hospital's long-term commitment to these innovations. However, we believe that the findings are relevant to other hospitals, which as reflected in many of the facilitators and barriers associated with the innovations, share the high risks, limited resources, and highly educated professionals found in health care.
Conclusion
On the basis of a near-20-year experience with aviation-based innovation, we recommend that hospitals start with relatively simple innovations and use a systematic approach toward the goal of improving safety. Budgeting adequate resources for implementation of innovation may itself require innovation.
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Tool ■ For every quarter since 2008, a full day of surgery has been videotaped with a handheld videorecorder. ■ The tapes are analyzed by an aviation expert, and the most useful parts were used in a feedback session for the surgical team. All feedback is given by the aviation expert, who does not fingerpoint but provides examples of aviation practices. ■ If the surgical team consented, a selection of the video images and the related feedback was provided with others during a medical staff meeting (see table below).
Outcomes
■ The video recordings have revealed team-specific differences in performing the time-out procedure and in use of the safety communication rules agreed on during the CRM training; they have also showed that the absence of team members at the preoperative briefing results in less structure and some communication lapses during surgery.
Sidebar 6. Black Box (2008)
Examples of Video Observations and Feedback to Multidisciplinary Team
Item Observation Feedback
Mental preparation
Before the patient was on the operating table, it The performing surgeon is not able to prepare mentally was not yet agreed who (attending or resident) was and obtain situational awareness. supposed to perform the surgery.
Briefing
After the patient arrived in the operating room, A "captain" needs to have the situational awareness a resident and student received a medical-technical regarding the competences of his colleague performing the explanation about the procedure. There was no operation. To prevent such errors, he or she briefs him before talk about who would be performing what actions as to what to expect, so the situational awareness of the or potential problems. As it turned out, the resident "copilot" is updated. The copilot can ask questions or was asked to jump in during the surgery and was not make things clear to the whole team. prepared to do so.
Projection
The ophthalmologists discussed the surgery schedule for This is a good example of correct projection of tasks the day and indicated that the first surgery in the afternoon and managing of resources. was expected to take 2.5 hours. He asked the team to plan their lunch time accordingly.
Time-Out
The time-out was performed, but there was no How can we ensure that the time-out procedure is check against the information in the medical chart.
performed in a standardized manner?
New Tip Halfway during surgery, a scalpel with new tip was The fact that surgeons did not know about the new tip can be on the surgery table. The surgeons did not know why.
observed as a "threat" from the organization. Are the communication procedures from the organization to surgeons sufficient, and did the team take responsibility and sufficient measures to prevent errors from such threats?
Communication
The surgeon asks for an intraocular lens (IOL) , When the IOL is unpacked, it was shown to be the wrong and the circulating nurse gets one. Before putting it on one. Why not close the communication loop before the surgery table, she says "20" but did not receive a unpacking the IOL or implement a check moment before? response from the surgeon. After a while, the surgeon asks to see the chart to check the IOL power.
Frequently, a task or some material is required, but Communication possibilities at the surgery are limited is not repeated in a standardized manner to confirm (e.g., covered face, working hands, not looking at each that it is understood. other), which every team member should be aware of and try to compensate for. Closing the communication loop during handovers (repeating an assignment, saying "check" or "yes") seems to be useful.
Assertiveness
As the ophthalmologist prepared to wash the eye, The circulating nurse's assertiveness was perfect, as the circulating nurse asks if the right method and was the reaction of the ophthalmologist. material were used.
